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The "sovereignty" concept was ultimately formed during the rise of the absolute monarchy in Europe. Whereas in the Middle Ages the king was merely a suzerain of suzerains, each of which enjoyed own rights and power, the Early Modern Period gave to philosophy the theory of the divine rights of kings. Because people agreed with the cornerstone right of the king's power and let his successors govern it, it lost any right for self-governance, thus the natural right to rule a political society was fully granted to the king since then. In this way, the king was entitled to the supreme power which was natural and unalienable to such a degree that the dethroned kings and their successors kept this right for life, completely regardless of their subjects' will. Such was the way that the solid foundation of royal sovereignty gave birth to the principle of legitimism that would play a tremendous role in political philosophy and statehood of post-Napoleonic France.
Thomas Hobbes wrote that the consent of irrational beings is determined by nature while "the agreement of these creatures is Natural; that of men, is by Covenant only, which is Artificiall: and therefore it is no wonder if there be somewhat else required (besides Covenant) to make their Agreement constant and lasting; which is a Common Power, to keep them in awe, and to direct their actions to the Common Benefit […] And he that carryeth this Person, as called SOVERAIGNE, and said to have Sovereigne Power; and every one besides, his SUBJECT." The "sovereignty" concept was introduced into emerging democracy by Jean Jacques Rousseau. He claimed that the Social Contract "gives the body politic absolute power over all its members also; and it is this power which, under the direction of the general will, bears, as I have said, the name of Sovereignty." In admitting God to be the only sovereign, Guizot in fact deprives sovereignty of the real subjectivity. The political explanation of this is obvious: the doctrinarian centrist was guided by the goal of eliminating the threat of legitimization of tyranny both from the "right" and from the "left." He admits that "because no authority in this world is and cannot be what it ought to be, no one has the right to call himself a sovereign." 18 Indeed, acknowledging any real subject as a sovereign would mean recognition of his absolute power and impeccability, that is the reification of symbols. Criticizing theories which reify sovereignty, Guizot concludes: "…one should deny the existence of any sovereignty on the earth; or, if it does exist, we must pay due respect to it,
give up any resistance and submit."
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According to Guizot, no absolute power can be legitimate as it potentially suggests arbitrary rule, hence, there can be neither sovereignty, nor a sovereign on the earth. 20 . Neither the people (or its representatives), nor a monarch would claim involuntary authority and exist beyond the normally operating rule of law. If man, by nature, is imperfect and subject to misapprehension, no impeccable and perfect authority, vested with sovereignty by right, can either fall into the hands of man or come out of the depths of human society. However, according to Guizot, neither people nor their rulers wished to acknowledge this fact: some endlessly sought protection of the absolute legitimate power, while others sought sovereignty by right, and, with it, unrestricted legitimacy that does not depend on anyone.
21
Thus Guizot challenges the fundamental attribute of human (false) sovereignty -its absoluteness. This follows in the footsteps of Benjamin Constant, who claimed that "with the word "absolute," neither liberty, nor, as we will see subsequently, peace, nor happiness, is possible under any institutional arrangements." 22 According to Constant, "no authority on the earth is unlimited -neither the rule of the people, nor the rule of individuals naming themselves its representatives, nor the rule of kings, under whatever name they governed, nor the rule of law, which, depending on the form of government, being merely the expression of the popular will or a sovereign, must stay within the same boundaries as does the authority it stems from." 23 Guizot translates the problem of uniform sovereignty into pure abstraction, claiming that the only legitimate by nature is reason, truth, justice or, "saying in language, more appropriate to philosophy, this is the unshakable Being, whose laws are reason, truth, justice." 24 At the same 7 time, the thinker states that these categories are comprehensible for man: "…if man had not been opinion of Guizot, such are the conditions of human existence -a short period of human life, and immediacy of needs.
Through the problem of sovereignty, Guizot comes to the division of powers principle.
Factual sovereignty, no matter where it exists, is subject to division, which is necessary to prevent usurpation of power and bring people under the rule of "the only legitimate sovereign"
(reason, truth, justice). Factual sovereignty is thought of as a fruit of effort, "a result of approach and collision of powers, equal and capable of making one another jointly search for the truth in order to unite only in its womb." 33 In contrast to Montesquieu, 34 Guizot concentrates not on the balance of powers, calling this idyl "an empty word" and "chimera," but on their struggle and work. Wise management of this struggle with the purpose of merging powers "in the womb of genuine unity" is a hard task fraught with the danger of one branch of power gaining excessive supremacy over another.
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Admitting the reciprocal limitation of power within the real sovereignty, Guizot calls into question the second important attribute of human sovereignty -unity. Again, the thinker agrees with Constant, who was convinced that "until sovereignty remains unlimited, there is no way to secure individuals from the rule." "supremacy of the common will over any individual will" 37 is an important, indisputable and unshakable principle. Constant caution with conservative arguments of opponents of popular sovereignty, noting that during the Restoration period attempts were made to malign the popular will principle "and all maladies it causes, and all crimes committed under pretext of implementing the common will give visionary strength to speculations of those who want to determine the source of might of governments." 38 However, admitting popular sovereignty per se, Constant urged the restriction of it, believing that philosophers who confered unlimited powers to popular sovereignty were wrong. 39 Nevertheless, Constant, following Montesquieu, believed that the rule of a small group of most prepared people, "sanctioned by the general consensus", could grow into the common will. In other words, the universal suffrage is a sufficient filter to realize popular sovereignty and ensure the highest legitimacy of power.
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Guizot could not agree with this view. Joining the numerical majority is not the best form of legitimacy. Guizot believed that political theoreticians had driven themselves to a nonplus when trying to once and for all make a choice between universal suffrage and the lack of it.
"Some totally denied the voting right, though they had no intention of destroying freedom.
Others advocated the general voting right, though had to continually refute themselves." 40 The error of such an approach is that its authors suggested a numerical majority always or never is the best proof of the legitimacy of power. In Guizot's opinion, all of this is conditional and depends on the different repitition in which man and society find themselves. 41 . He maintains that the extent of application of the voting right should incessantly vary "because this right legally belongs to capability." 42 In other words, the voter corps will expand depending on the growth of educated and fulfilled persons, or as Guizot defined it, the middle class.
In realistic policy, Guizot's sovereignty theory meant renunciation of expanding the voter corps with the purpose of non-admitting to political life of unprepared social classes who do not have property and education. Guizot, like all Orleanists, opposed the idea of popular sovereignty as in practice it boiled down to the "town square sovereignty" and individual sovereignty, or anarchy. Such sovereignty is based on simple force, being, in fact, a form of absolute power. It knows no rules, limits, constitution, laws, good, evil, past and future. Guizot's mentor and ally, Royer-Collard, said, "Claims of a most capricious and crazy tyranny do not go as far as do claims of popular sovereignty, for there is no tyranny that would be so much free from responsibility." 43 The collective subject is the most unprincipled and irresponsible politician who can bring a tyrant to power. The Napoleon monarchy is such an example.
A critical view of popular democracy was commonplace in the ideology of doctrinaires and was rooted in the experience of the French Revolution. Guizot and his fellow-thinkers, during philosophical discussions and parliamentary debates, often exemplified the darkest days of the Revolution in their critic of democratic ideas. They regarded the Jacobin terror as a direct consequence of implementing the popular sovereignty principle, which then transformed itself into a new form of tyranny. should 1793 repeat itself for you to understand the insolvency of popular sovereignty?" 44 All precautions against limitless power would be pointless if sovereignty was not divided.
In Guizot's opinion, it is not popular or monarchic sovereignty that must reign a society, but a sovereignty that is mobile and immortal -the sovereignty of reason, "the only genuine lawmaker of humankind." One year after his forced resignation, Guizot wrote: "Democratic idolatry (l'idolâtrie démocratique) is the greatest of evils that corrupt and destroy governments and freedoms, human dignity and happiness of [people]" 45 . Fourteen years on, the philosopher used more moderate words and admitted that democracy could play a certain role "only through the agency of the royal power". 46 The thinker admitted that "democracy has more rights and plays a significant role in the contemporary world, more than in any other epoch, at least in big states." 47 But this political form has little in common with popular sovereignty, and is still not the only possible, let alone best, option. Democracy is like "juice flowing up the tree from roots to branches but it is not a tree with its flowers and fruits. It is like a wind that fills the sails and drive ships forward, but it is neither the sun that lights the road, nor a compass that navigates them. Democracy has the spirit of progress but it lacks the gift of preservation and precaution.
She gets easily excited and is lavish with words on the prospects of freedom, but in her intoxication she falls an easy prey of charlatans flattering her, after which she gets tyrannically outraged with freedoms she doesn't like. She gets easily excited but resists too weakly. She is more likely to destroy than preserve." 48 Democracy is deceitful as it makes empty promises of universal happiness and welfare. Democracy is immoral as it appeals to the rights of the darkest part of society. 49 Guizot attributed a temporary success of democracy to the "fatal mistakes of civilization" 50 , mortal for humankind 51 .
Guizot points to a gradual conceptual substitution of the notion, "democracy." Through the course of time, democracy has become interpreted as equal opportunities, including the participation in government, but not as direct popular rule. Political freedom is characteristic not only of democracy alone. What prevented citizens (in the times of Orleanism) from making efforts to overcome property and educational qualifications? There "didn't exist any aristocratic privileges", "all careers were open", "taxes applied to everyone, with individual freedoms guaranteed to all"? Orleanism (liberal conservatism) did not promise universal equality, but it 12 sovereignty became confused with government and sometimes with the personality of the head of state. In an absolutist state, sovereign and government became one. "Government proclaimed itself vested with initial and unalienable sovereignty nobody had the right to control. And people themselves thought in the same way." 58 Even though Guizot considered this situation to be significantly better than the old anarchy, the thinker admitted that such an understanding of sovereignty was erroneous.
The philosopher was convinced that government is neither the product of force, nor the result of a contract, whereas a social contract, binding people with the laws of justice and truth,
is not the result of man's creativity, nor are the laws themselves: "This is the divine contract, into which by the hand of the Almighty are inscribed the rules of all human relations, He sets mutual obligations between government and society precisely by virtue of what is supreme in relation to both of them." 59 The thinker substantiates it with the following logical argument: man has no power to breach this contract or forget it for a long time without being punished.
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Guizot makes no effort to make his own classification of forms of government, which many political philosophers had tried to do before him. What is more, he believes that any such classification would be arbitrary and deceitful as it is based on certain features and distinctions that were alternately sought in the forms of government or some of its manifestations. Such was the way monarchy, aristocracy, democracy was made: "…all these names not so much reveal the principle as they reflect the facts; they are borrowed from the external form of government, not affecting its internal nature and its laws." 61 Many philosophers, Montesquieu in particular, were attempting to solve this problem purely theoretically. Unlike his predecessors, Guizot thinks historically. While for Montesquieu, the principles of monarchy, despotism and republic are manifested in different times in different countries, for Guizot there exist only specific historical circumstances constructing some or other political forms, similar only in form.
The philosophical problem of sovereignty is closely associated with the principle of legitimism, as determining the nature of a sovereign might help find the source of legitimacy of power, while "legitimate power was always man's goal." 62 Many biographers referred young
Guizot to the adherents of Charles Maurice de Taleyrand and François Rene de Chateaubriand, who claimed that the legitimacy of the royal power is "a protective stronghold for the peoples"
and for this very reason it "must be sacred." While Taleyrand speaks about legitimacy in general, regardless of the form of government ("Under legitimate power, be it monarchic or republican, 58 Ibid. P. 519. 59 Ibid. P. 525. 60 Ibid. 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid. P. 512.
